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NOTES & COMMENTS
Compelled Commercial Disclosures:
Zauderer’s Application to Non-Misleading
Commercial Speech
ALEXIS MASON*
In 1980, the Supreme Court held that a prohibition on
commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Roughly five years later, in Zauderer, the Court provided guidance on specific instances in which the government
may compel commercial speech. The Court held that a requirement that goods or services disclose “factual and uncontroversial” information is constitutional so long as
the requirement is not unduly burdensome, and the requirement is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.” This holding applied a rational basis standard of review to compelled commercial
speech aimed at curing deception of consumers.
Despite this guidance, since the Zauderer decision, federal appellate courts have applied the holding inconsistently—some courts have limited Zauderer’s rational basis
application to compelled commercial speech disclosures
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that are “factual and uncontroversial” and cure deception
of consumers; while other courts have applied it to all compelled commercial speech disclosures that are “factual and
uncontroversial” regardless of whether the speech cures deception of consumers. This Comment advocates to limit the
rational basis standard of review to compelled commercial
speech disclosures that are “factual and uncontroversial” and cure deception of consumers. The alternative, applying rational basis to large swaths of disclosures, may lead
to drowning out important information or bolstering ideological beliefs because there will always be a legitimate government interest to compel, i.e. the consumer “right to
know.” Commercial speech is protected speech, and the
First Amendment protects against speech compulsions just
as it protects against speech prohibitions. Limiting the application of Zauderer would ensure that only legitimate and
beneficial disclosures are compelled, and that First Amendment protections are not abridged.
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INTRODUCTION

“WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes
to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”1
“If you carry or use your phone in a pants or shirt pocket or tucked
into a bra when the phone is ON and connected to a wireless network, you may exceed the federal guidelines for exposure to RF radiation.”2
“The products in this case that contain or may contain milk from
rBST-treated cows either (1) state on the package that rBST has
been or may have been used, or (2) are identified by a blue shelf
label . . . or (3) a blue sticker on the package . . . .”3
These three statements are examples of government mandated
compelled commercial speech disclosures. Currently, compelled
commercial speech jurisprudence is unclear, at best. The Supreme
Court has given clearer guidance, however, on the constitutionality
of prohibited commercial speech.
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., the Supreme Court held that a regulation that completely bans
an electric utility company from advertising to promote the use of
electricity violated the First Amendment after failing to satisfy a
four-part analysis.4 In its four-part analysis, the Court asked (1)
whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment, noting
that it “at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading”;
(2) “whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial”; (3)
“whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted”; and (4) “whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest.”5 Thereby, a prohibition on commercial
1

Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 888 (9th Cir.

2017).
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th
Cir. 2017).
3
Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996).
4
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566–71 (1980).
5
Id. at 566 (“At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that
2
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speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and, accordingly, any curtailing of speech must be justified by a substantial government interest.6
Roughly five years later, in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, the Supreme Court provided guidance on specific instances in which the government may compel commercial speech.
The Court held that a requirement that the purveyor of a good or
service disclose “factual and uncontroversial” information is constitutional so long as the requirement is not unduly burdensome, and
the requirement is “reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”7 This holding applied a more lenient rational basis test, as opposed to Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test, when “factual and uncontroversial” information
was compelled to cure deception of consumers.8
Since Zauderer, the Court has upheld compelled commercial
speech under the Zauderer rational basis test, when the speech is
curing deception of consumers, and struck down compelled commercial speech under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test,
when the speech is not curing deception of consumers. In Milavetz,
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 9 the Supreme Court upheld a regulation that required certain debt-relief assistance professionals to disclose in their advertising that their services were related
to bankruptcy relief and to further identify themselves as “debt-relief agencies.”10 The Supreme Court explained that the advertising
was misleading because it offered “debt relief without any reference
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we
ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than is necessary to serve that interest.”).
6
See id. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (emphasis added).
8
See id. at 638 (citing Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566) (noting that
“[c]ommercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful
activities, however, may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.”);
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554 (6th Cir.
2012).
9
559 U.S. 229, 232 (2010).
10
Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 232.
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to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent
costs.”11 The Court noted, however, that the “same characteristics of
[the Milavetz regulation] that make it analogous to the rule in Zauderer serve to distinguish it from those at issue in In re R.M.J.,12 to
which the Court applied the intermediate scrutiny of Central Hudson.”13 According to the Milavetz Court, the R.M.J. regulations,
which required that attorneys advertise their practice in terms prescribed by the State Supreme Court, were improper.14 The State had
failed to show that the advertisements were themselves likely to mislead consumers.15 In contrast with R.M.J., the Milavetz Court concluded that “[e]vidence in the congressional record demonstrating a
pattern of advertisements that hold out the promise of debt relief
without alerting consumers to its potential cost . . . is adequate to
establish that the likelihood of deception in this case ‘is hardly a
speculative one.’”16
Despite this guidance, since the Supreme Court’s decision in
Zauderer, federal appellate courts have applied the holding inconsistently—some courts have limited Zauderer’s rational basis application to compelled commercial speech disclosures that are “factual
and uncontroversial” and cure deception of consumers;17 while
11

Id. at 250.
455 U.S. 191 (1982).
13
Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 250.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 251 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 652 (1985)).
17
See Ocheesee Creamery LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235–36 (11th
Cir. 2017) (noting that a speech restriction that neither concerns unlawful activity
nor is inherently misleading may only be regulated if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 281–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that a
guideline could not compel commercial speech on legal advertisements when the
guideline did not require disclosing anything that could reasonably remedy consumer deception); Greater Balt. Ctr. for Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v. Mayor of
Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “[d]isclosure requirements
aimed at misleading commercial speech need only survive rational basis scrutiny,
by being ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.’”); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Attorney Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218
(5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a regulation that imposes a disclosure obligation on
a potentially misleading legal advertisement will survive First Amendment review
if the required disclosure (1) passes intermediate scrutiny or (2), if the ad is related
to preventing consumer deception and passes rational basis); Milavetz, Gallop &
12
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other courts have applied it to all compelled commercial speech disclosures that are “factual and uncontroversial” regardless of whether
the speech cures deception of consumers.18 The latter courts note
that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Zauderer “seems inherently
applicable beyond the problem of deception, as other circuits have
found.”19
Compelled commercial speech should be subject to Central
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny test unless the speech falls within
Zauderer’s ambit because commercial speech is protected speech,
and “the First Amendment protects against speech compulsions just
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 541 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that a
requirement that professionals assisting consumers with bankruptcy must state
that they are a debt relief agency in their ads is constitutional because the speech
in question was directed at misleading commercial speech); Pharm. Care Mgmt.
Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding, under rational basis
review, mandated disclosures by pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) of economically significant information designed to protect covered entities from questionable PBM business practices); Cent. Ill. Light Co. v. Citizens Util. Bd., 827 F.2d
1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a mandatory commercial disclosure was
unconstitutional when it was not justified by consumer deception, but by a legitimate state police power interest).
18
See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891–92 (9th
Cir. 2017) (holding that Zauderer’s “framework applies when a state requires disclosures for a different state interest, such as to promote public health” by requiring warnings about health effects of certain sugar-sweetened beverages); Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that
compelling “country of origin labeling,” while not necessary to cure deception, is
subject to rational basis scrutiny); Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 263–
66 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a requirement that a corporation disclose the name
of a competitor’s repair shop to customers fell outside Zauderer’s “factual and
uncontroversial” bounds); Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States,
674 F.3d 509, 554–55 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that Zauderer allows mandated disclosures that serve “some substantial interest”); N.Y. State Rest. v. N.Y. City Bd.
of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 117–18, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New York City
regulation that required certain restaurants to post calorie content information on
menus and menu boards that were not previously deceptive under rational basis
review); United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 844, 849–50 (10th Cir. 2005)
(noting that despite being upheld as part of the federal government’s broad powers
to regulate securities, section 17(b)’s disclosure requirements would have been
upheld as a regulation on commercial speech; even when the government has not
shown that absent the required disclosure the speech would be false or deceptive,
and even when the disclosure requirement serves some substantial government
interest other than preventing deception, such as fraud prevention).
19
Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 22.
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as it protects against speech limitations.”20 Accordingly, compelled
commercial speech is a subset of commercial speech generally and
should receive the same constitutional protection.21 It is not a separate category of speech under the First Amendment.22 This protection of commercial speech, which upholds compulsions under rational basis review when speech is misleading, will allow government efforts to protect consumers, when necessary, and will allow
consumers to obtain information they desire about products and services.23 “A dynamic market discovery process, with only limited
and targeted government interventions, is a more effective way to
serve the consumer interest in obtaining more complete information
about goods and services.”24
To that end, Zauderer should be narrowly interpreted in that rational basis should apply only if the advertisement is misleading or
deceptive because (1) the alternative—applying rational basis when
the compelled disclosure is “factual and uncontroversial”—is unworkable and leads to inconsistent court rulings; (2) moreover, applying rational basis to such large swaths of disclosures may lead to
compelling too much information, compelling the wrong kind of information, or bolstering the government’s ideological beliefs because there will always be a legitimate government interest to compel, i.e. the consumer “right to know.”
This Comment argues that the proper application of Zauderer
rational basis is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must ask if the
commercial speech is deceptive or misleading.25 If the commercial
Jonathan H. Adler, Opinion, “Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer ‘Right to Know’”, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 1, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/05/01/compelled-commercial-speech-and-the-consumer-right-toknow/?utm_term=.9e979632b5ad.
21
Jonathan H. Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech and the Consumer
“Right to Know”, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 421, 421 (2016) [hereinafter Adler, Compelled
Commercial Speech].
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
“There are three general categories of commercial speech: non-misleading,
potentially misleading, and misleading. The more misleading the advertisement,
the more constitutional leeway is granted the States in restricting it.” Dwyer v.
Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2014). In this context, “[c]ommercial speech
that is not false, deceptive, or misleading” may only be restricted if the regulation
20
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speech is not deceptive or misleading, intermediate scrutiny should
be applied. If the commercial speech is deceptive or misleading, the
court must ask if the compelled commercial speech is “factual and
uncontroversial” speech intended to cure the deception. If so, rational basis should apply. Otherwise, intermediate scrutiny should
apply.
The second part of this Comment will discuss the background of
the commercial speech doctrine—detailing the three eras of commercial speech, why commercial speech is protected, and how the
First Amendment core values are affected by commercial and compelled commercial speech, respectively. It will also detail the seminal case Zauderer and the circuit splits that exist in Zauderer’s application. The third part of this Comment will advocate for narrowing Zauderer’s application to “factual and uncontroversial” speech
that aims to cure deception. And finally, the fourth part will offer
concluding thoughts.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.
Doctrine
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”26 This amendment prohibits laws abridging the free-

withstands intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of
Bus. & Prof’l Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994). States may prohibit potentially
misleading ads, but only if the information cannot be presented in a way that is
not deceptive (such as through adding a disclosure requirement). In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982). Advertising that is inherently misleading or has proven to
be misleading in practice “may be prohibited entirely.” Id. To repeat in another
way, restrictions on speech get protection under the Constitution inversely proportional to the deceptiveness of the target advertisement. This note covers misleading speech, inherently misleading speech, and potentially misleading speech
that cannot be presented in a way that is not deceptive when it references speech
that is “deceptive” or “misleading.”
26
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

1202

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1193

dom of speech, which, “as a general matter[,] means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”27
The Supreme Court has held, generally, that when the speech in
question is protected, it is held to the same standard of review regardless of whether it is compelled or prohibited.28 Therefore, the
First Amendment guaranty of free speech “includes the right to refrain from speaking,” subject only to the warranted level of state
interest required to support the restriction or regulation in the particular context.29 Commercial speech is generally held to an intermediate scrutiny standard of review.30 Nonetheless, compelled commercial speech may be held to a rational basis standard of review
when it cures deception of consumers.31
1.
THREE ERAS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
There are arguably three eras of Supreme Court jurisprudence
on commercial speech; demonstrating that, historically, the Supreme Court has disfavored protecting commercial speech.32

Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 121 (2011) (quoting
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
28
See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797
(1988) (quoting W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943))
(“[T]he right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary
components of the broader concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’”); see also
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 657–58 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 716 (1977).
30
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563, 584, 596, 598 (1980).
31
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
32
See generally Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 564 (2011) (explaining that because the law at issue regulated speech based on its content,
heightened scrutiny was appropriate, irrespective of whether the law involved
commercial speech); Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 568–71 (1980) (upholding
some protection for commercial speech—essentially intermediate protection); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771–72 (1976) (holding that as long as the advertisement was truthful and not
advertising anything illegal, the First Amendment should protect it); Valentine v.
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1942) (holding that commercial speech was not
entitled to First Amendment protection).
27
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Initially, the Supreme Court provided commercial speech with
no First Amendment protections.33 The Court reasoned that the
broad commerce clause powers of the government must reasonably
include the power to regulate speech concerning articles of commerce.34 In Valentine v. Chrestensen, the Court officially held that
commercial speech was not entitled to First Amendment protections.35 In its decision, the Court distinguished speech that is of public interest and speech that is for private profit.36 The Court kept this
prohibition on protection in place in large part until 1976’s Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc.,37 which overturned Valentine.
The second era of commercial speech jurisprudence, which can
be considered the Central Hudson era, was ushered in with Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the
Commonwealth of Virginia passed a law making it illegal for pharmacists to advertise prices of prescription medicine, as doing so
could promote aggressive advertising that would ultimately hurt
consumers by diminishing the service pharmacists could provide.38
A consumer group challenged the law, saying that citizens had a
right to the price information.39 In a 7–1 ruling, the Court overturned
the law, noting that the distinction between regular speech and commercial speech was “simplistic.”40 The real issue, the Court said,
was that the speech itself satisfied the public interest by preserving
the free flow of information:
So long as we preserve a predominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in

33

See Dayna B. Royal, Resolving the Compelled-Commercial-Speech Conundrum, 19 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 205, 213 (2011) (citing Valentine, 316 U.S.
at 54).
34
See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 53–55.
35
Id. at 54–55.
36
See id. at 54–55. Subsequently, the Court’s rationale for affording commercial speech more protection continued to center on satisfying the public interest by preserving free flow of information. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 763–65.
37
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
38
See id. at 748–49, 754–56.
39
See id. at 748, 756.
40
Id. at 758–60.
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large measure will be made through numerous private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and well informed. To this end, the free flow
of commercial information is indispensable.41
The Court held that as long as the advertisement was truthful and
not advertising something illegal, the First Amendment should protect it.42 The court noted that although commercial speech should
receive some First Amendment protection, it should not receive the
same level of protection as other speech.43 “Less explicit in the
Court’s decision . . . was the recognition that commercial speech can
also serve to advance the broader interests of democratic self-governance” and self-expression or autonomy.44 In this second era of
commercial speech, the Court provided some commercial speech
protection—essentially intermediate protection—on the basis that
this speech may help further consumer’s interest in the free flow of

41

Id. at 763–65.
See id. at 771–72.
43
See id. at 771–73, 771 n.24.
44
Jonathan H. Adler, Persistent Threats to Commercial Speech, 25 J.L. &
POL’Y 289, 295, 295 n.28 (2016) [hereinafter Persistent Threats]; accord Robert
Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88
CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2372 (2000) [hereinafter Reconciling Theory] (recognizing
the relationship between commercial information and democratic self-governance); Martin H. Redish, Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and
the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 81
(2007) (“[S]peech concerning commercial products and services can facilitate private self-government in much the same way that political speech fosters collective
self-government.”); Daniel E. Troy, Advertising: Not “Low Value” Speech, 16
YALE J. ON REG. 85, 100, 100 n.73 (1999) (challenging the notion that commercial information or advertising is less valuable than other forms of speech).
42
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commercial information.45 The free flow of commercial information, in turn, guarantees the capacity for democratic self-governance and self-expression or autonomy.46
The third era of commercial speech has been ushered in over the
past two decades, as the Court has ratcheted up the level of protection for commercial speech under the First Amendment, while nonetheless disagreeing about the level of protection that it should be afforded.47 Commercial speech jurisprudence in this third era
acknowledges the consumer interests that justify the preservation of
a diverse marketplace of ideas about goods and services. 48 Justice
Thomas has stated that commercial speech should be protected to
the same extent as other forms of speech49: “I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial’ speech is
of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech. Indeed, some historical materials suggest to the contrary.”50 Additionally, he has stated,
45
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 563, 584, 596, 598 (1980) (“The free flow of information is important
in this context not because it will lead to the discovery of any objective ‘truth,’
but because it is essential to our system of self-government.”); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760 (noting that speech has value in the marketplace of
ideas).
46
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765, 777; see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
47
See Royal, supra note 33, at 214–15; Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at
291, 291 n.9 (citing Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002)) (affording more protection for commercial speech by invalidating prohibitions on
pharmacy advertising for drug compounding and noting that “[n]ot all commentators see this as a positive development”).
48
Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 291, 291 n.10; accord Sorrell v. IMS
Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 579 (2011) (“The commercial marketplace, like other
spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of slight worth.
But the general rule is that the speaker and the audience, not the government,
assess the value of the information presented.”).
49
Cf. Sorrell, 546 U.S. at 564–66, 572, 593 (explaining that because the law
at issue regulated speech based on its content, heightened scrutiny was appropriate, irrespective of whether the law involved commercial speech. In the end, the
Court applied the more lenient Central Hudson test that it frequently applies to
commercial speech, reasoning that because the regulation could not withstand
even Central Hudson scrutiny, it was unnecessary to apply heightened scrutiny.)
50
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 522, 522–23 n.4 (1996)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (citing, among other sources, 19th and 20th century
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“[i]n my view, an asserted government interest in keeping people
ignorant by suppressing expression ‘is per se illegitimate and can no
more justify regulation of ‘commercial’ speech than it can justify
regulation of ‘noncommercial speech.’”51 It is possible that the
Court may adopt his view.
A majority of the Court recently entertained Justice Thomas’ position when, in dicta, it explained that heightened scrutiny was appropriate, irrespective of whether the law involved commercial
speech.52 The Court noted that the law at issue regulated speech
based on its content.53 Nonetheless, “[i]n the end, . . . the Court applied the more lenient Central Hudson test,” reasoning that it was
unnecessary to apply heightened scrutiny “because the regulation
could not withstand even Central Hudson scrutiny.”54
2. WHY PROTECT COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND PREVENT COMPELLED
COMMERCIAL SPEECH?
Commercial speech should be protected because doing so is consistent with three core First Amendment values: “(1) . . . encourag[ing] a diverse marketplace of ideas” and the free flow of information; “(2) . . . facilitat[ing] participatory democracy; and (3)
. . . promot[ing] individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-realization.”55 The rationales for protecting commercial speech are
similar to the rationales for curtailing compelled commercial
speech.56 These three core First Amendment values, however, are
jeopardized in additional ways when compelling commercial
speech, as discussed below.
cases in which freedom of the press was cited to preclude Congress from preventing the circulation of lottery advertising through methods other than the United
States mail).
51
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting 44 Liquormart Inc., 517 U.S at 487).
52
Royal, supra note 33, at 215 (citing Sorrell, 546 U.S. at 564–67).
53
Id.
54
Id. (citing Sorrell, 546 U.S. at 564–67, 588–89).
55
Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1277,
1291–92 (2014); accord Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) [hereinafter Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech].
56
See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1291–92; see also Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 10–11.
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a.
Encourage a Diverse Marketplace of Ideas
The value of a diverse “marketplace of ideas” is in the advancement of truth through the free flow of information and opinions.57
The First Amendment aims to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail” by ensuring the
“right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences.” 58 This may not be
constitutionally abridged.59
1.
Commercial Speech
Commercial speech should be protected to cure asymmetry of
information.60 Commercial speakers are in the best position to communicate important information to consumers that they would not
ordinarily know in making consumption decisions.61 In providing
important commercial information, commercial speakers contribute
to the market place of ideas.62 While some commercial information
may be of slight worth, “the general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented.”63 People will perceive their own best interests only if
they are sufficiently well informed.64 “[T]he best means to that end

57
Vernon R. Pearson & Michael O’Neill, The First Amendment, Commercial
Speech, and the Advertising Lawyer, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 293, 296 (1986).
58
Id. at 296 n.16.
59
Id.
60
See Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53
B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1165 (2012).
61
Alan Howard, The Constitutionality of Deceptive Speech Regulations: Replacing the Commercial Speech Doctrine with a Tort-Based Relational Framework, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1093, 1113 (1991).
62
See Brudney, note 60, at 1202–04, 1211; see also Constitutional Status of
Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 14–15.
63
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (“The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and cultural life, provides a forum where
ideas and information flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some
of slight worth . . . . [E]ven a communication that does no more than propose a
commercial transaction is entitled to the coverage of the First Amendment.”).
64
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 763–65, 770 (1976); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 766 (noting that a ban
on commercial speech “threatens societal interests in broad access to complete
and accurate commercial information”). See also Bianca Nunes, Note, The Future
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is to open the channels of communication rather than to close
them.”65
2.
Compelled Commercial Speech
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed because it
forces commercial speech participation, thereby distorting the marketplace of ideas. Distortion does not mean “under-representation”
or “over-representation” of particular viewpoints.66 Instead, it refers
to the introduction of error into the marketplace of ideas. 67 “Compelled speech can lead to error if its content is inaccurate or misleading or if its context fails to make clear whether the message is the
government’s or the compelled speaker’s.”68 Audiences, too, will
suffer as distortion in the marketplace of ideas hinders the capacity
for effective and accurate democratic self-governance and self-expression or autonomy.69
Compelled commercial speech also distorts the market place of
ideas by chilling speech and causing a deprivation to the market
place of ideas.70 “[F]or example, a speaker may decide not to speak
at all if her speech must include the state’s compelled message.”71
Audiences, too, will suffer as a result of never hearing what that

of Government-Mandated Health Warnings After R.J. Reynolds and American
Meat Institute, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 177, 181–82 (2014).
65
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
66
Corbin, supra note 55, at 1294. “Compelled speech does not inevitably
distort the discourse. Quite the contrary: a compelled disclosure may clarify otherwise misleading speech.” Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765, 777; see also N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
70
Corbin, supra note 55, at 1344. Compelled commercial speech does not
inevitably deprive the marketplace of ideas. In the context of centers that are
forced to espouse pro-life views, Corbin has stated, “[i]t is possible that some
Centers may decide to curtail their advertisements if forced to disclose their prolife point of view. However, since they had not highlighted these pro-life beliefs
in their advertisements in the first place, no viewpoint will disappear from the
marketplace of ideas.” Id.
71
Id. at 1293–94.
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speaker might have said.72 This will hinder public debate and “unintentionally undermine rather than advance the free speech goal of
[providing] more information, opinions, and views.”73
b.
Facilitate Participatory Democracy
“Participatory democracy” is a two-prong American free speech
value that (1) assures “an informed electorate” by “allow[ing] citizens to learn about the public affairs of the day” in order to make
well-informed decisions74 and (2) assures “the opportunity for individuals to participate in the speech by which [they] govern themselves.”75
1.
Commercial Speech
Commercial speech should be protected “because it circulates
information necessary for the education of those who participate in

Id. at 1294 (citing Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (striking right to reply statute on free press grounds)).
73
Id. In Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, the potential loss of speech led
the Supreme Court to invalidate a right of reply law. See generally Miami Herald
Publ’g, 418 U.S. at 241. A Florida statute, which aimed to ensure balanced coverage, required “that after a newspaper attacked a political candidate, it must allow
the criticized candidate to respond.” Corbin, supra note 55, at 1294; accord Miami
Herald Publ’g, 418 U.S. at 244. “The Court worried that rather than be forced to
let others use their pages, the newspapers might temper their political criticisms,
thereby [hindering] the vigor of public debate.” Corbin, supra note 55, at 1294;
accord Miami Herald Publ’g, 418 U.S. at 257.
74
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 969–70 (2009); accord Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom
of Speech for Libraries and Librarians, 85 LAW LIBR. J. 71, 77 (1993) (“[T]he
First Amendment protects not only individual self-expression, but also the right
to receive information and ideas. The right to receive inures in the right to send,
for without both a listener and a speaker, freedom of expression is as empty as the
sound of one hand clapping.”).
75
James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 491, 498 (2011); accord Corbin,
supra note 55 at 1293–94 (quoting Reconciling Theory, supra note 44, at 2368)
(“[C]rucial to democratic self-determination is ‘the ability of individual citizens
to participate in the formation of public opinion.’”); Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 12–13.
72
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public discourse.”76 Any information contributes to what is necessary for participatory democracy, regardless of whether the speaker
is a company or individual.77
2.
Compelled Commercial Speech
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed because it
does not facilitate a participatory democracy in that the speaker is
not participating out of desire. It is forced participation, conveying
forced content.78 “[I]n order for our democracy ‘of the people, by
the people, for the people’ to work, the people need the ability to
shape political debate . . . .”79 If the speaker is not the origin of the
message, the political debate is distorted. Additionally, compelled
commercial speech may chill speech, as stated above, thereby limiting people’s ability to participate in political discourse and undermining what makes this nation a democracy—the ability of all citizens to vote for policymakers and voice their opinions on what those
policies should be.80
As stated above, audiences, too, will suffer as the speaker’s
forced participation, or lack thereof, may lead to distortion or deprivation in the public debate, thereby hindering its vigor.81
76

Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867,
874–75 (2015) [hereinafter Post, Compelled Commercial Speech].
77
See id.; Brudney, supra note 60, at 1157–58 (noting that “commercial
speech . . . is ‘enriched,’ in that it does more than simply articulate the terms of
the proposed transaction”); see also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
78
See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1295 (noting that compelled speech misrepresents true views of speakers and may lead an audience to credit it more than
they would have otherwise).
79
Id. at 1292.
80
See id. at 1292–95 (noting that compelled commercial speech chills speech
and stifles self-expression of the speaker). “It also limits people’s ability to participate in political discourse, and what makes the nation a democracy is not just
that everyone gets to vote for policymakers, but that everyone gets to put in their
two cents worth on what those policies should be.” Id. at 1293.
81
Id. at 1293–95 (“The government could also distort the discourse by misrepresenting the true views of speakers. For example, if the government forces
speakers to convey an opinion they disagree with, and if an audience believes that
the message is the private speakers’ rather than the government’s, the audience
may erroneously conclude that the message is more widespread than it really is.
This mistaken view will make audiences credit it more than they would have otherwise, as studies show that the perceived popularity of a message can increase
its persuasiveness.”).
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c.

To Promote Individual Autonomy, Self-Expression, and
Self-Realization
“At the most basic level, free speech autonomy means being able
to decide what one says: compelled speech ‘violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has
the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.’”82
1.

Speaker

A.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
The justifications for affording First Amendment protection to
commercial speakers on the basis of “promot[ing] individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-realization” are weak,83 but have
been upheld by courts.84 It is undisputed that companies have free
speech rights, but the rationale varies.85
Free speech rights for companies have been rationalized a variety of ways. One rationale is the company’s inherent autonomy and
ability to determine the content of its speech.86 “A corporation
speaks by hiring someone to create speech or to write for it.”87 The
notion that the individual controls what she says and what she thinks
“does not lose its protection because of the corporate identity of the
speaker.”88 Another rationale for companies’ free speech rights is
that “corporations are sometimes legally recognized as ‘persons’—

82

Id. at 1299 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of
Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
83
Id. at 1285, 1291 (noting that commercial speech is economically motivated). But see Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, supra note 55, at 6–
7, 10–12.
84
See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342–43
(2010) (holding that the First Amendment does not allow prohibitions of speech
based on the identity of the speaker); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759, 2768 (2014). For an overview on Supreme Court case
law on corporate speech, see John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First
Amendment: History, Data, and Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT 223, 248–54
(2015).
85
Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not
Free, 83 IOWA L. REV. 995, 1000–01 (1998).
86
See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768; see also Corbin, supra note 55, at 1299.
87
Greenwood, supra note 85, at 1056.
88
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986).
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such as a ‘person’ with a right to contract89—when ‘personhood’
enables them to fulfill their economic purpose.”90 A third rationale
is that the individual people that make-up companies have autonomy
rights.91 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court, in reference to the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, held that when
rights are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the
rights of people, including shareholders, officers, and employees associated with the corporation in one way or another.92
B.
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed, under the
three aforementioned autonomy rationales for protecting commercial speech, to promote speaker autonomy by ensuring that the
speaker rather than the government controls what she says and what
she thinks. A person is not autonomous in body or thought if forced
to speak, and state a belief with which she disagrees, when she
would prefer to remain silent. 93 Additionally, speakers may suffer
the harm of misattribution if listeners regard the government’s opinion as the speaker’s opinion.94 Free speech autonomy calls for the
ability to decide what one says: “compelled speech ‘violates the fundamental rule of protection under the First Amendment, that a
speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.’”95 The choice to speak encompasses the choice of what not to
say for both individuals and corporations.96

89

Corbin, supra note 55, at 1315 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819)) (recognizing corporations’ right to contract); see also
Cty. of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 409 (1886) (recognizing corporations’ right to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment).
90
Corbin, supra note 55, at 1315 (quoting Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate
First Amendment Rights After Citizens United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
209, 221–22 (2011)).
91
See Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2768.
92
Id.
93
See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1298–99 (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay
Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995)).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986)
(“For corporations[,] as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the
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Listener

A.
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial speech should be protected because democratic
self-governance and knowledge of commercial affairs is integral to
“promot[ing] individual autonomy, self-expression, and self-realization” for the listener.97 The listener should be able to receive any
information that will contribute to her ability to make well-informed
consumer decisions.98
If the government curtails the available information, it is influencing the individual’s ability to decide and create his or her own
self-identity/governance. The First Amendment protects “speech
that more directly engages an individual’s autonomy interest in personal self-realization by protecting utterances and receipt of expression that serve any and all personal interests.”99 It is strongly argued
that the experience in uttering, receiving, and considering commercial speech has such value.100
Accordingly, commercial speech may be enriched, “in that it
does more than simply articulate the terms of the proposed transaction or describe the identified products or services.”101 Commercial
choice of what not to say.”); see also Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech,
supra note 55, at 26.
97
Corbin, supra note 55, at 1291, 1300–08, 1347.
98
See id. at 1292; Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 874–75;
see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763–65 (1976).
99
See Brudney, supra note 60, at 1164 n.32.
100
See Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 298–99; Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1272–73 (1995) [hereinafter Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine]; see also Martin H. Redish, Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 606–07 (1982); David A. J. Richards,
Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amendment,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 76–77 (1974); David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy,
and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 345 (1991).
101
Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 298–99; Brudney, supra note 60, at
1157–59, 1211–13; see also Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note
100, at 1272–73; Redish, supra note 100, at 606–07; Strauss, supra note 100, at
345; Richards, supra note 100, at 76–77. For example, purchasing a product can
be an ethical or political act. Consider the consumer who buys a Prius or insists
upon shopping at a “socially reasonable” store. See Persistent Threats, supra note
44, at 299.
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speech may also communicate supplementary expressions about
personal or social preferences.102 These supplementary expressions
reflect “matters of collective or public interest to society and engage
. . . the interest of . . . the audience in considering such matters in
addition to . . . making the purchase.”103
The First Amendment aims to protect this persuasive or informative speech from government regulation in order to facilitate society’s collective actions and nurture social attitudes and values. Despite the fact that commercial speech persuades or informs mainly
to prompt the purchase of a service or product for a consumer’s own
consumption or enjoyment,104 “individual choices driven by conceptions of self-benefit may result in imitative, or even aggregate, communal choices by individuals.”105
B.
COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Compelled commercial speech should be curtailed because antipaternalism—the idea that the government should not decide what
information audiences can or cannot access—underlies our free
speech jurisprudence.106 “The First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark
for what the government perceives to be their own good.”107
While compelled speech seems to escape this particular concern
since the government is not restricting information but providing
102

Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 298–99; Brudney, supra note 60, at
1157–59, 1211–13 (“[I]t may promote the seller’s products or services by highlighting their health and safety benefits, or ego-enhancing features, or public policy benefits for society.”); see also Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, supra note 100, at 1272–73; Redish, supra note 100, at 606–07; Richards, supra
note 100, at 76–77; Strauss, supra note 100, at 345. For example, purchasing a
product can be an ethical or political act. Consider the consumer who buys a Prius
or insists upon shopping at a “socially reasonable” store. See Persistent Threats,
supra note 44, at 299.
103
Brudney, supra note 60, at 1176.
104
Id. at 1185.
105
See id. at 1185 n.100. Returning to the Prius example mentioned above,
Prius’ are common in Los Angeles where environment sustainability is a concern
among many. An individual buying a Prius could communicate a message about
his or her environmental and possibly political affiliations. Others may imitate
that behavior to convey a similar message.
106
See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1300.
107
Id. (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 546 U.S. 552, 577 (2011)).
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more of it,108 government-compelled commercial speech may
threaten listener autonomy through paternalistic ends and manipulative means.109 Distrust of the government, while not a First
Amendment core value, is an underlying principle relevant to this
inquiry.110
d.
Distrust of Government
As Justice Scalia stated, “it is safer to assume that the people are
smart enough to get the information they need than to assume that
the government is wise or impartial enough to make the judgment
for them.”111
Paternalistic ends in government-mandated disclosures are evident when the government “crosses the line when it compels disclosures not to inform, but to persuade.”112 It is less concerning when
the state uses its coercive power to provide information that clarifies
or information that is in the exclusive possession of the speaker and
more concerning when the state uses its coercive power to compel
disclosures in order to convince the audience to do what the state
thinks is right.113
However, interference may be acceptable in certain situations.
“Even those possessing [a] strong sense of autonomy . . . would
probably agree that compelling additional information that correct[s] the speaker’s false or misleading speech does not illegitimately interfere with the intended beneficiary’s autonomy.”114
Id. at 1301 (quoting Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l Regulation, 512
U.S. 136, 142 (1994)) (noting that compelled disclosures are preferable to censorship as “disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such information”).
109
Id. at 1301.
110
Id. at 1292, 1301–04.
111
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 804 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
112
Corbin, supra note 55, at 1302.
113
See id. Admittedly, “not every state attempt to persuade sufficiently respects the audience’s autonomy. The government’s goal makes a difference. Most
suspect is when the state urges a course of action that actually detracts from the
audience’s autonomy.” Id. at 1303. As an example, “[u]rging people not to
vote . . . would seem to undermine rather than enhance people’s autonomy.” Id.
114
Id. at 1302 (noting that the government compelled warnings would not be
paternalistic if the mandated information consisted of accurate facts meant to in108
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Compelled speech might undermine the free speech goal of autonomous decision-making even when the government’s end is justified by relying on illegitimate and manipulative means. “The . . .
question is whether and when appeals . . . rise to the level of ‘manipulation.’”115 The government may manipulate audiences (1) intentionally, when it compels false or misleading speech, or (2)
through misattribution, when it fails to make clear that the information represents the government’s opinion and not the speaker’s
opinion.116 This form of “deception amounts to a ‘denial of autonomy’ because it ‘interfere[s] with a person’s control over her own
reasoning processes.’”117
Accordingly, an audience may erroneously conclude that a message is more widespread than it really is if it believes that the message is the private speakers’ rather than the government’s.118 This
may lead an audience to credit the opinion more than they would
have otherwise.119 “In such cases, the government uses its coercive
power to persuade not by virtue of the underlying worthiness of its
message, but by taking advantage of misattribution and a heuristic.”120

form, rather than influence, the audience’s decision making; especially if the information cured a potentially misleading or deceptive advertisement, or if the information were not otherwise available).
115
Id. at 1304.
116
Id.
117
Id. (quoting Strauss, supra note 100, at 354).
118
Id. at 1295.
119
See id. (noting that as studies show that the perceived popularity of a message can increase its persuasiveness); see also Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1010 (2004) (“The phenomenon of popular influence is well-established in the social science literature,
which shows that ideas perceived to have achieved broad acceptance are generally
more persuasive.”).
120
See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1295. Professor Caroline Corbin of the University of Miami School of Law stated the following on this issue: “[O]ur minds
have developed a . . . faster, easier method to help process information. This cognitive process relies on heuristics—rules of thumb—and ‘more accessible information such as the source’s identity or other non-content cues.’ Heuristics . . . can
lead to errors in some predictable ways . . . . [R]esearch shows that . . . our decision
making is riddled with cognitive shortcuts that regularly distort how we gather
and process information. Just as compelled speech that attempts to exploit factual
errors is distorting, compelled speech that intentionally exploits predictable cog-
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B.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel
Subsequent to Central Hudson, in which the Supreme Court set
out the intermediate scrutiny standard for commercial speech,121
Zauderer was decided.122
1.
THE CASE
In 1982, attorney Zauderer took out advertisements in thirty-six
Ohio newspapers announcing that his firm represented women on a
contingent-fee basis in cases related to injuries caused by the Dalkon
Shield Intrauterine Device (IUD).123 The advertisements provided a
telephone number that individuals could call for “free information.”124 Zauderer acquired clients as a result of the ads.125
The Supreme Court took issue with the advertisement, which informed the public that “if there is no recovery, no legal fees are owed
by our clients.”126 The Court noted that the advertisement did not
distinguish “legal fees” from “costs” for the “layman not aware of
the meaning of these terms of art” and that the advertisement suggested a “no-lose proposition” in that Zauderer’s representation
would “come entirely free of charge.”127 The Court found the likelihood that potential clients would be misled was “hardly a speculative one: it is commonplace that members of the public are often
unaware of the technical meanings of such terms as ‘fees’ and
‘costs’—terms that, in ordinary usage, might well be virtually interchangeable.”128 When the possibility of deception is as self-evident
as it was in this case, the Court held that it would “not require the
State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public before it [may] determine
nitive errors can be considered distortion of the discourse. Speaker confusion invites exploitation of another common heuristic: the ‘defer-to-trusted-expert’ heuristic. By compelling an authority figure to speak its message, the government can
‘add a patina of trustworthiness and expertise to its message.’” Id. at 1295–97.
121
See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
122
See generally Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626
(1985).
123
Id. at 630–31.
124
Id. at 631.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 652.
127
Id.
128
Id.
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that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.’”129 The Court
found that a speech compulsion clarifying that clients will have to
pay costs even if their lawsuits are unsuccessful was proper.130 In
finding so, the Court noted that the attorney’s interest in not providing such purely factual and uncontroversial information was “minimal” and that the compulsion need be judged only by an easy-tosatisfy rational basis test.131 That test was satisfied here, the Court
held, because the disclosure requirement was “reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.”132
2.

CIRCUIT SPLITS ON ZAUDERER’S APPLICATION

a. Split in the Requirement of “Curing Consumer Deception”
This circuit split concerns whether compelled commercial
speech disclosures should be subjected to a rational basis analysis
only when the government is compelling “factual and uncontroversial” information to prevent “deception of consumers” or also when
the government is compelling “factual and uncontroversial” information with other policy objectives in mind. Thus, the overarching
question is whether the government must meet a more rigorous
standard when the government is not seeking to prevent deception.133 The circuits have split and follow one of two rules stated
below.134
Some circuits—the Second,135 D.C.,136 the Ninth,137 and the
Tenth138—have found that the government can compel any “factual
and uncontroversial” disclosure on an ad, label, or other commercial
129

Id. at 652–53 (quoting FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–
92 (1965)).
130
Id. at 653.
131
Id. at 651–53.
132
Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
133
See Note, Repackaging Zauderer, 130 HARV. L. REV. 972, 972–73 (2017).
134
See id.
135
See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113–14 (2d. Cir.
2001).
136
See Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
137
See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891–92 (9th
Cir. 2017).
138
See United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 844, 849–50 (10th Cir. 2005).
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speech.139 These circuits have held that Zauderer applies because
the rules at issue only require the disclosure of “factual and uncontroversial information” that is rationally related to a state’s legitimate interest.140 This is a broad reading of Zauderer. As Judge Stephen Williams explained in AMI, “Zauderer is best read as applying
not only to mandates aimed at curing deception but also to ones for
other purposes.”141 Although this conclusion is arguably consistent
with the conclusions reached by other circuits, it represents a misreading of Zauderer and effectively eliminates meaningful constitutional protection for compelled commercial speech.142

See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891–92 (9th
Cir. 2017) (holding that Zauderer’s “framework applies when a state requires disclosures for a different state interest, such as to promote public health” by requiring warnings about health effects of certain sugar-sweetened beverages); Am.
Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27 (holding that compelling “country of origin labeling,”
while not necessary to cure deception, is subject to rational basis scrutiny); Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 263–66 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a requirement that a corporation disclose the name of a competitor’s repair shop to
customers fell outside Zauderer’s “factual and uncontroversial” bounds); Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554–55 (6th Cir.
2012) (noting that Zauderer allows mandated disclosures that serve “some substantial interest.”); N.Y. State Rest. V. N.Y. City Bd., 556 F.3d 114, 117–18 132
(2d Cir. 2009) (upholding a New York City regulation that required certain restaurants to post calorie content information on menus and menu boards that were
not previously deceptive under rational basis review); United States v. Wenger,
427 F.3d 840, 844, 849–50 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that despite being upheld as
part of the federal government’s broad powers to regulate securities, section
17(b)’s disclosure requirements would have been upheld as a regulation on commercial speech; even when the government has not shown that absent the required
disclosure the speech would be false or deceptive, and even when the disclosure
requirement serves some substantial government interest other than preventing
deception, such as fraud prevention).
140
See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 113–15 (holding that statute
imposing labeling requirements upon mercury-containing lamps as to their content and proper method of disposal did not violate manufacturers’ free speech
rights, as required disclosure of such factual commercial information was rationally related to state’s legitimate goals of protecting human health and environment
and increasing consumer awareness of mercury presence in certain products); Am.
Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 891–92.
141
Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 36 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Am.
Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 746 F.3d 1065, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
142
See Note, supra note 133, at 973–75.
139
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Other circuits have found that the proper rule is that the government can only compel a “factual and uncontroversial” disclosure on
an ad, label, or other form of commercial speech if it is curing an
otherwise deceptive ad, label, or other form of commercial
speech.143 This is a narrow reading of Zauderer. As explained below, the argument here is that there is no conflict between Central
Hudson and Zauderer, so the two are best understood as two aspects
of the same underlying doctrine and not as alternatives.144 The
courts do not have to choose between them.145
Split in the Requirement of “Factual and Uncontroversial”
The federal courts of appeal have also been inconsistent in determining what kinds of disclosures are “purely factual and uncontroversial,” in the words of the Zauderer opinion. 146 For that reason,
b.

143

See e.g., Ocheesee Creamery, LLC v. Putnam, 851 F.3d 1228, 1235–36
(11th Cir. 2017) (noting that a speech restriction that neither concerns unlawful
activity nor is inherently misleading may only be regulated if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 281–83 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding
that a guideline could not compel commercial speech on legal advertisements
when the guideline did not require disclosing anything that could reasonably remedy consumer deception); Greater Balt. Ctr. For Pregnancy Concerns, Inc. v.
Mayor of Balt., 721 F.3d 264, 283 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting that “[d]isclosure requirements aimed at misleading commercial speech need only survive rational
basis scrutiny, by being ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.’”) (citations omitted); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. La. Att’y Disciplinary Bd., 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that a regulation that
imposes a disclosure obligation on a potentially misleading legal advertisement
will survive First Amendment review if the required disclosure (1) passes intermediate scrutiny or (2), if the ad is related to preventing consumer deception, and
it passes rational basis); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559
U.S. 229, 248–52 (2010) (holding that a requirement that professionals assisting
consumers with bankruptcy must state that they are a debt relief agency in their
ads is constitutional because the speech in question was directed at misleading
commercial speech); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 (1st
Cir. 2005) (upholding, under rational basis review, mandated disclosures by pharmacy benefit managers (PBM) of economically significant information designed
to protect covered entities from questionable PBM business practices); Cent. Ill.
Light Co. v. Citizens Util. Bd., 827 F.2d 1169, 1173 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
a mandatory commercial disclosure was unconstitutional when it was not justified
by consumer deception, but by a legitimate state police power interest).
144
Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 436.
145
See id.
146
See infra pp. 32–36.
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the next part of this Comment will advocate for a narrow reading of
Zauderer, in which the “factual and uncontroversial” analysis is
done only after a finding that the compelled commercial speech
cures deception.
III.

FOR NARROW ZAUDERER

“Zauderer, properly understood, fits comfortably within the
Central Hudson framework.”147 The First Amendment provides
equivalent protection for both the right to speak and the right not to
speak, and there is no reason to assume that mandatory disclosures
get a pass in the commercial context.148 Under Central Hudson,
commercial speech is only eligible for heightened protection if the
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading.149 Zauderer’s
holding that mandatory disclosures will be readily upheld so long as
they are reasonably related to the state’s interest in preventing deception of consumers was not novel—it was a straightforward application of Central Hudson.150 Accordingly, commercial speech is
not protected if it is deceptive, and compelled commercial speech is
not curtailed if it prevents deception.
A.
The Test
This Comment argues that the proper application of Zauderer
rational basis is a two-step inquiry. First, the court must ask if the
commercial speech is deceptive or misleading. If the commercial
speech is not deceptive or misleading, intermediate scrutiny should
be applied. If the commercial speech is deceptive or misleading, the
court must ask if the compelled commercial speech is “factual and

147

Jonathan H. Adler, What are the Constitutional Limits on Compelled Commercial Speech?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (April 7, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/04/07/whatare-the-constitutional-limits-on-compelled-commercialspeech/?utm_term=.7c84521a6ca2 [hereinafter Constitutional Limits].
148
See id.; Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 432.
149
447 U.S. 557, 557 (1980).
150
Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 435.
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uncontroversial” speech intended to cure the deception. If so, rational basis should apply.151 Otherwise, intermediate scrutiny should
apply.
B.
Unworkable
As stated above, in theory, compelled disclosures are a good
idea.152 Factual disclosure laws, which inject more information into
the marketplace of ideas, further First Amendment goals.153 “In fact,
‘it is often the very purpose of compelled speech requirements to
correct market flaws in the marketplace of ideas and further the First
Amendment’s goal of maximizing communication and discovery of
truth.’”154 Nonetheless, broad Zauderer has subjected too many
mandated disclosures to rational basis review and eliminated meaningful protection for commercial speech.
This Comment advocates for the application of narrow Zauderer
because passing mandated commercial speech disclosures pursuant
to any legitimate state interest on the basis that the compelled speech
is “factual and uncontroversial” is unworkable in that it leads to inconsistent court rulings. For that reason, the solution is to not begin
the inquiry with “factual and uncontroversial.” Instead, the “factual
and uncontroversial” requirement should be considered in the context of Zauderer’s full-holding. It should be linked to correcting deception. In essence, this two-step inquiry requires deception in the
commercial speech before asking if the compelled commercial
151

Surgeon General Warnings are required on tobacco products despite the
fact that the products are not deceptive. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL (May 27, 2004), available at https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/sgr/2004/complete_report/index.htm. This Note advocates for surgeon general warnings on the basis of the history of deception with these advertisements.
See Pub. Citizen v. La. Att’y Disciplinary, 632 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2011)
(“Advertising that ‘is inherently likely to deceive or where the record indicates
that a particular form or method . . . of advertising has in fact been deceptive’
receives no protection and the State may prohibit it entirely.”) (citation omitted).
152
See supra pp. 22–23.
153
See Corbin, supra note 55, at 1302.
154
Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 551 (2012) (quoting
David W. Ogden, Is There a First Amendment “Right to Remain Silent”?: The
Supreme Court’s “Compelled Speech” Doctrine, 40 FED. B. NEWS & J. 368, 370
(1993)).
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speech is “factual and uncontroversial.” This should alleviate some
of the consequences of applying the unworkable “factual and uncontroversial” test.
1.
DEFINING A WORKABLE STANDARD
A workable test or standard “allows one to distinguish the relevant limitations from the irrelevant [limitations].”155 It is a test that
clearly distinguishes between two possibilities and clarifies where
theory and practice meet.156 A test or standard is unworkable when
it is too hard to actually apply, and if, from the viewpoint of judicial
discretion, it is subjective.157
2.
UNWORKABLE BROAD ZAUDERER
The broad Zauderer test is unworkable as evidenced by inconsistent appellate court rulings.158

155

Mattias Derlén & Johan Lindholm, Article 28 E.C. and Rules on Use: A
Step Towards a Workable Doctrine on Measures Having Equivalent Effect to
Quantitative Restrictions, 16 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 191, 200 (2010).
156
See id. at 224; see also Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of
the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 917 (1963) (noting that “rules must be
workable in terms of the realities of maintaining a system in the everyday world”
and that “judicial administration . . . is a critical factor.”); Jacy T. Jasmer, ETW
Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.: A Workable Standard, an Unworkable Decision,
5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 293, 313–14 (2004) (noting that “[d]espite the criticism of the ‘transformative elements’ test established in Comedy III, the test is
essentially workable for three reasons: (1) it strikes the correct balance between
the right of publicity and First Amendment rights; (2) it allows courts to make
necessary fact specific determinations; and (3) other alternative approaches do not
offer any improvements; on the contrary, they may be even more faulty.”).
157
See Jasmer, supra note 156, at 313–14; see also Emily Michele Papp, Note,
Just Take My Word for It: Creating a Workable Test to Ensure Reliability in Overseas Document Verification Reports for Asylum Proceedings, 101 IOWA L. REV.
2141, 2165–66 (2016); see e.g., Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 459 F.3d 255, 258–
59, 270 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing between a workable and unworkable test
used to determine the authenticity of documentary evidence submitted to support
an application for asylum by holding that one test was unworkable because it was
not succinct and made compliance overly burdensome).
158
See Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 314.
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a.
Defining “Factual and Uncontroversial”
“Factual and uncontroversial” is a term of art that is not readily
understood. Consequently, courts rule inconsistently because it is
unclear what makes a mandated disclosure “factual and uncontroversial.”159 The difficulty in classifying “factual and uncontroversial” is exemplified in the subsequent court rulings.
In 2012, the D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food
& Drug Admin., was asked to determine whether the Food and Drug
Administration’s rule requiring display of new textual and graphic
images on cigarette packaging was unconstitutional.160 While acknowledging that none of the images were “patently false,” the court
wrote that the images were “not ‘purely’ factual because . . . they
are primarily intended to evoke an emotional response.”161 The court
linked “factual and uncontroversial” communications with “pure attempts to convey information.”162 As noted by compelled commer-

159

See Timothy J. Straub, Comment, Fair Warning?: The First Amendment,
Compelled Commercial Disclosures, and Cigarette Warning Labels, 40
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1201, 1252–53, 1252 n.381 (2013); see also Am. Beverage
Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that factual
accuracy is, at a minimum, controversial when a warning provides an unqualified
statement); CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1117
(9th Cir. 2017) (“Given that the purpose of the compelled disclosure is to provide
accurate factual information to the consumer, we agree that any compelled disclosure must be ‘purely factual.’ However, ‘uncontroversial’ in this context refers
to the factual accuracy of the compelled disclosure, not to its subjective impact on
the audience.”); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(looking to the dictionary for the definition of “controversial”); Safelite Grp., Inc.
v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 263 (2d Cir. 2014) (“On a cursory review, our precedent
arguably supports the district court’s conclusion that this law simply requires disclosure of accurate, factual information.”); Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.,
760 F.3d 18, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating that a required disclosure “could be so
one-sided or incomplete that [it] would not qualify as ‘factual and uncontroversial’” under Zauderer); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (holding that a disclosure was not purely factual because it “intended to evoke an emotional response.”) overruled by Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
160
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1208.
161
Id. at 1216–17.
162
Id.
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cial speech scholars, “what are ‘pure attempts to convey information’?”163 “[T]he opinion suggests that the D.C. Circuit would require the government to limit compelled disclosures to ‘just the
facts,’ presented in black and white, if [rational basis review] is to
apply.”164
Subsequently, in American Meat Institute v. Dept. of Agriculture,165 the D.C. circuit revisited and overturned R.J Reynolds, now
defining “factual” and “uncontroversial” as a two-step independent
inquiry.166 “Controversial” was interpreted as something that “communicates a message that is controversial for some reason other than
dispute about simple factual accuracy.”167 The concurrence in American Meat Institute v. Dept. of Agriculture noted that it is unclear
how judges should assess and determine if a disclosure is “controversial.”168
Courts have continued to define “factual and uncontroversial”
differently. A year after American Meat Institute, in National Association of Manufacturers, the D.C. Circuit once again detailed the
lack of clarity in defining this standard and stated that “uncontroversial” must mean something different than “purely factual.”169 It
looked to the dictionary definition of “controversy” to find that it “is
a dispute, especially a public one.”170 The Sixth Circuit, by contrast,
held that the “purely factual and uncontroversial” phrase from Zauderer was merely descriptive and not a legal standard.171 That court

163

Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial
Speech, 50 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 53, 62 (2016). “The phrase presumably refers
to one (or both) of the following distinctions: (1) text-only, factual disclosures are
‘pure’, while pictorial images are, at least potentially, ‘inflammatory’ and therefore non-factual; and/or (2) the straightforward, nonjudgmental conveyance of
factual information is ‘pure,’ while efforts to influence consumer behavior are
not.” Id.
164
Id.
165
Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18, 23, 27 (D.C. Cir.
2014).
166
Id.; see also Berman, supra note 163, at 70.
167
Am. Meat Inst., 760 F.3d at 27.
168
Id. at 34 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
169
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F.3d 518, 528–29 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
170
Id. at 529.
171
Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 554–55
(6th Cir. 2012).
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held that textual warnings requiring disclosure of factual information rather than opinions is subject to rational basis scrutiny.172
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit has stated, “[g]enerally, a disclosure
requirement is purely factual and uncontroversial under Zauderer so
long as it ‘provide[s] accurate factual information to the consumer.’”173
A few courts, including the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in R.J
Reynolds, have insinuated that “disclosures that ‘persuade’ are less
factual that [sic] those that merely ‘inform.’”174 But how does one
tell the difference? The issue here is that seemingly every informative or factual disclosure also aims to persuade.175 For example, a
disclosure requirement that states, “Smoking [c]auses Lung Cancer,
Heart Disease, Emphysema, [a]nd May Complicate Pregnancy” is
both factual and persuasive.176 Therefore, it may be unworkable to
distinguish fact from opinion.177 Further, if courts were to deem unenforceable disclosures that are an expression of opinion or that
evoke an emotional response, instead of fact, “[o]pponents of mandated warnings will nearly always be able to point to some scientific
studies questioning the government’s position.”178
b.
Consequences of an Unenforceable Test
When applying an unworkable standard, court holdings seem
nonsensical. For example, in 2017, the Ninth Circuit decided two
cases applying the same “factual and uncontroversial” test in both:
“[g]enerally, a disclosure requirement is purely factual and uncontroversial under Zauderer so long as it ‘provide[s] accurate factual

172

Id. at 561–62.
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 893 (9th Cir.
2017) (quoting CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105,
1118 (9th Cir. 2017)).
174
Berman, supra note 163, at 67.
175
See id. at 67–68; Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at
907 (“The boundary between fact and opinion is an intrinsically troubled area.”).
176
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98–474, § 4(a)(1), 98
Stat. 2200, 2201 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1333). This Note
advocates for surgeon general warnings. See supra note 151.
177
Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 76, at 907–08.
178
Berman, supra note 163, at 72.
173
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information to the consumer.’”179 Nonetheless, the holdings are difficult to reconcile.
In CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, the Ninth Circuit upheld the city of Berkeley’s requirement that cell-phone retailers warn customers about possible safety risks of carrying a cell
phone too close to one’s body and thereby exposing oneself to excessive levels of “RF radiation.”180 The court upheld the compelled
disclosure pursuant to the federal government’s interest in “protecting [consumer] health and safety.”181 The court found that this disclosure requirement was “reasonably related to [protection of the
health and safety of consumers]” despite conceding that the FCC
“lack[ed] . . . proof of dangerousness . . . .”182 To justify this decision, the court noted that the compelled disclosure was “purely factual” because each sentence was “literally true.”183 This holding
contradicted a similar case decided by the Ninth Circuit a few years
earlier.184
Subsequent to CTIA-Wireless, in American Beverage Association, the court struck down San Francisco’s requirement that advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages within San Francisco include the following statement: “WARNING: Drinking beverages
with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”185 The court seemed to distinguish this case from CTIAWireless because this case involved a “literally true but misleading
disclosure [that] creates the possibility of consumer deception.”186
In this case, as in CTIA-Wireless, the court upheld the “protect[ion]
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 893 (quoting
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105, 1118 (9th Cir.
2017)).
180
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d at 1111–12.
181
Id. at 1118–19.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
See Berman, supra note 163, at 70–72 (noting that in 2012 the Ninth circuit
decided a case that involved a mandated disclaimer similar to the one in CTIAWireless. In that case, the court stated that because “‘[t]here is a debate in the
scientific community about the health effects of cell phones,’ this was an expression of [] ‘opinion,’ rather than an expression of fact.”).
185
Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 888, 897–98
(9th Cir. 2017).
186
Id. at 893.
179
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of [consumer] health and safety” as a valid government interest .”187
In deciding whether the mandated disclosure was “purely factual
and uncontroversial,” the court noted that
[t]he warning provides the unqualified statement that
“[d]rinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay,” S.F.
Health Code § 4203(a), and therefore conveys the
message that sugar-sweetened beverages contribute
to these health conditions regardless of the quantity
consumed or other lifestyle choices. This is contrary
to statements by the FDA that added sugars are “generally recognized as safe.”188
In this case, the court found the language of the disclosure was
misleading in that it did not qualify that “overconsumption of sugarsweetened beverages contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay, or that consumption of sugar-sweetened beverages may contribute to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”189 Additionally, the court
noted that the “message [was] deceptive in light of the current state
of research on [the] issue.”190
The differing outcomes in these cases are nonsensical. The statement “drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay” is no more misleading than the statement on radiation exposure’s dangerousness.191 Both statements, as
admitted by the Ninth Circuit of Appeals, are scientifically unproven
187

Id. at 894.
Id. at 895.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
See id; CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 854 F.3d 1105,
1118–19 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[T]here was nothing before the district court showing
that such radiation had been proven dangerous. But this is beside the point. The
fact that RF radiation from cell phones had not been proven dangerous was well
known to the FCC in 1996 when it adopted SAR limits to RF radiation; was well
known in 2013 when it refused to exclude cell phones from its rule adopting SAR
limits; and was well known in 2015 when it required cell phone manufacturers to
tell consumers how to avoid exceeding SAR limits. After extensive consultation
with federal agencies with expertise about the health effects of radio-frequency
radiation, the FCC decided, despite the lack of proof of dangerousness, that the
best policy was to adopt SAR limits with a large margin of safety.”).
188
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or unqualified.192 The only notable distinction between the disclosure mandated in CTIA-Wireless and American Beverage Company
is that the former used qualifying language, such as “may exceed the
federal guidelines for exposure to RF radiation,” and the latter failed
to use qualifying language.193
In these cases, the Ninth Circuit has articulated yet another
seemingly arbitrary guideline for “factual and uncontroversial”—
one that hinges on whether the language is “literally true,” yet admittedly, unproven or unqualified. The problem here is not that the
Supreme Court has failed to give guidance on what is “factual and
uncontroversial,” but that it is almost impossible to formulate a
workable guideline.
This could not have been what the Zauderer Court had in mind
when it held that a “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosure
that is not unduly burdensome will withstand First Amendment
scrutiny so long as it is reasonably related to curing deception of
consumers.194 First, the Ninth Circuit makes its decision pursuant to
the government’s interest in protecting consumer health and
safety.195 Second, the Ninth Circuit, in conceding that the health
warnings mentioned in the mandated disclosures were not scientifically qualified, fails to delineate a link between the mandated disclosure and the government’s interest in protecting consumer health
and safety.196 Allowing mandated disclosures that satisfy an arbi-

192

Id.
Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 895–96.
194
See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
195
Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 894; CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d
at 1119.
196
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n, 854 F.3d at 1118–19 (“[T]here was nothing before the district court showing that such radiation had been proven dangerous. But
this is beside the point. The fact that RF radiation from cell phones had not been
proven dangerous was well known to the FCC in 1996 when it adopted SAR limits
to RF radiation; was well known in 2013 when it refused to exclude cell phones
from its rule adopting SAR limits; and was well known in 2015 when it required
cell phone manufacturers to tell consumers how to avoid exceeding SAR limits.
After extensive consultation with federal agencies with expertise about the health
effects of radio-frequency radiation, the FCC decided, despite the lack of proof of
dangerousness, that the best policy was to adopt SAR limits with a large margin
of safety.”); see also Am. Beverage Ass’n, 871 F.3d at 895 (“Although San Fran193
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trary “factual and uncontroversial” threshold will effectively eliminate any meaningful First Amendment protection for commercial
speech.
This Comment argues that “factual and uncontroversial” is an
unworkable standard and therefore advocates for a rational basis
level of review only when the “factual and uncontroversial” mandated disclosure cures a finding of consumer deception.
C.
Undermine the Government Goal of Helping Consumers
By contrast, the broad “factual and uncontroversial” standard is
so malleable that it might make it too easy to uphold disclosures that
are inefficient. Governments, with increasing frequency, have been
applying rational basis, under the unworkable standard of “factual
and uncontroversial,” and requiring sellers to convey information
that cannot plausibly be deemed the sort of truthful, uncontroversial
information that consumers expect to see on product labeling. This
Comment advocates for the narrow application of Zauderer because
mandating commercial speech disclosures pursuant to any legitimate state interest on the basis that the disclosures are “factual and
uncontroversial” undermines the government’s goal of helping consumers. The cacophony of speech will (1) drown out the important
speech197 and (2) make it too easy for the government to mandate
ideological speech.198
1.
DROWNING OUT IMPORTANT SPEECH
Applying rational basis review to mandate commercial speech
disclosures that serve any legitimate state interest on the basis that
the disclosures are “factual and uncontroversial” will allow all mandated disclosures to survive free speech scrutiny since the consumer
cisco’s experts state that ‘there is a clear scientific consensus’ that sugar-sweetened beverages contribute to obesity and diabetes through “excessive caloric intake” and ‘by adding extra calories to the diet,’ the experts do not directly challenge the conclusion of the Associations’ expert that ‘when consumed as part of
a diet that balances caloric intake with energy output, consuming beverages with
added sugar does not contribute to obesity or diabetes.’”); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n
v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that where there is no scientific
evidence, a disclosure requirement can’t be justified on the basis of “real harms.”);
Berman, supra note 163, at 70–72.
197
See supra pp. 27–35.
198
Id.
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“right to know” justification is legitimate.199 This is problematic because allowing all mandated disclosures will lead to the loss or
drowning out of the important information. 200
Disclosure requirements have prompted legal challenges when
justified by an alleged consumer “right to know.”201 “[G]overnments have imposed . . . disclosure requirements extending beyond
product characteristics to” product history, production processes,
and information about the product or service provider.202 For example, in International Dairy Foods Association v. Amestoy, the Second Circuit struck down Vermont’s mandatory labeling requirements for milk from cows that were administered rBST.203 The FDA
had found that milk produced from cows treated with rBST was indistinguishable from milk from untreated cows, and no less safe.204
In fact, “the FDA declared that any suggestion that there is a meaningful difference would be ‘false and misleading.’”205

199

Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21 at 458. The consumer right to know is the “right to know information that could influence consumer decisions.” Id. at 442.
200
Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 311–312 (“[M]andating excessive information disclosure may actually result in the communication of less substantive
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E. Bialkova et al., Standing Out in the Crowd: The Effect of Information Clutter
on Consumer Attention for Front-of Pack Nutrition Labels, 41 FOOD POL’Y 65,
69 tbl. 2 (2013) (recognizing that increases in information can reduce consumer
attention and discernment); Elise Golan et al., Economics of Food Labeling, 24 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 117, 139 (2001) (noting that increased disclosure requirements
can result in less consumer understanding); Mario F. Teisl & Brian Roe, The Economics of Labeling: An Overview of Issues for Health and Environmental Disclosure, 27 AGRIC. & RESOURCE ECON. REV. 141, 148 (1998) (“[S]imply increasing
the amount of information on a label may actually make any given amount of
information harder to extract.”).
201
Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21 at 442–44, 458.
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Id. at 424.
203
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1996).
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See id. at 70, 75–76, 80; see also Bovine Somatotropin (BST), U.S. FOOD
& DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/ProductSafetyInformation/ucm055435.htm (last updated Oct. 19, 2016, 1:22 PM).
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See Persistent Threats, supra note 44, at 304 (quoting Interim Guidance on
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Consumers may or may not prefer milk from cows
that were administered rBST, and producers should
be free to use their labels to identify their products as
potentially desirable to consumers with particular
preferences, but should not be forced to do so . . . .
The government’s role is to ensure that whatever information is disclosed is truthful and not misleading,
not to mandate disclosure of product characteristics
important to some consumers but not others.206
Allowing all mandated disclosures cuts against First Amendment values and undermines the robust protection of commercial
speech more generally because it can lead to these inaccuracies,
overstatements, and misleading disclosures.207 “When the government requires a seller or producer to disclose specific information
about a product or service, the requirement itself communicates a
message.”208 It communicates that this is a factor consumers should
consider,209 “and may even suggest to some consumers that there is
something ‘wrong’ or unsafe about products bearing such a label.”210 Accordingly, allowing the cellphone disclosure requirement
in CTIA-Wireless may be counterproductive because it can mislead
a consumer into thinking radiation from cellphones is dangerous
when no scientific data indicates that is the case. Similarly, the rBST
disclosure communicates that rBST is a factor consumers should
consider despite the fact that milk produced from cows treated with
rBST was indistinguishable from milk from untreated cows.
“[T]he consumer right to know is a rationale without discernible
limits. If such an interest is a substantial interest then there is, quite
literally, no end to the disclosures that can be mandated,” as rational
basis review will be easy to meet. 211 A dynamic market discovery
process, with only limited and targeted government interventions, is
a more effective way to serve the consumer interest in obtaining
more complete information about goods and services.212
206
207
208
209
210
211
212

See Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 472–73.
See Corbin supra note 55, at 1292–95, 1300–04.
Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 447.
See id.
Id. at 449.
Adler, Compelled Commercial Speech, supra note 21, at 444.
Id. at 426.
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“The question . . . should not be whether the [government] gets
to avail itself of an easier constitutional test but whether the government has any interests that are substantial enough to justify this compelled speech requirement . . . .”213 These interests would have to go
beyond simply satisfying consumer curiosity or “right to know.”214
2.

OPEN TO ABUSE AND IMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT
IDEOLOGY
Allowing all mandated disclosures to survive free speech scrutiny under the consumer “right to know” justification is problematic
because the cacophony of speech will undermine the government’s
goal of efficiently informing consumers. Among the confusing or
counterproductive information that may be compelled when passing
mandated commercial speech disclosures pursuant to any legitimate
state interest on the basis that the compelled speech is “factual and
uncontroversial” is the government’s ideology.215 This happens because allowing a rational basis standard of review for any disclosure
that can qualify as “factual and uncontroversial,” where rational basis is easy to pass given the consumer “right to know” justification,
makes it too easy to uphold disclosures that are actually ideological.
The “factual and uncontroversial” broad approach does “not provide
. . . a principled way to discern, in any given case, whether a regulation mandates providing additional factual information (relatively
innocuous) or compels espousing beliefs and ideology (pernicious).”216 At least with the narrow approach, the compelled disclosure must be attempting to cure deception, which makes it less likely
to be motivated by ideology.
a.
Harm to Speaker
Compelling a commercial speaker to articulate the government’s
ideological message is anathema in free speech because it can effectively force producers and sellers to stigmatize their own products,

213

Constitutional Limits, supra note 147.
Id.
215
See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 894 (9th
Cir. 2017).
216
Royal, supra note 33, at 207.
214
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production methods, and beliefs by giving voice to a politically determined set of values.217
1.

FORCED TO CRITICIZE OWN PRODUCTS OR PRODUCTION
METHODS
These disclosures effectively force a producer or seller to stigmatize their own otherwise legal products and production methods
by forcing the speaker to testify against its own product and implicitly endorse the notion that the disclosure of a given fact should be
relevant to a consumer’s decision about whether to purchase the
product.218 “Such requirements may be used to pursue ideological
agendas or to place burdens upon competitors.”219 RBST labeling
illustrates this point.
As stated above, when producers adorn their product with an
“rBST free” label, they are communicating to consumers that this is
a product characteristic that they believe should influence consumer
choices, even though the FDA maintains that rBST does not alter
the content of the resulting food product.220 “The producer is required to give voice to the idea that a product that may contain
[rBST] is meaningfully different—normatively if not physically—
than a product that does not, even if the producer does not agree with
the message.”221
2.
ACTING AS A MOUTHPIECE FOR THE GOVERNMENT
Mandating such disclosures can effectively force producers and
sellers to give voice to a politically determined set of values that the
speaker may not agree with.222 The government-compelled message
may be misattributed to the speaker.223 This amplifies messages of
government preferences over the speaker’s preferences, which

217
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220
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skews public opinion in the marketplace of ideas.224 The repetitive
exposure to the message may lead to a soft form of mind control
over listeners,225 which gives the government message a better
chance of prevailing in the “marketplace of ideas” than the speaker’s
message.226
Consider Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, in which the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld South Dakota’s requirement that
physicians provide their patients with a written statement informing
women contemplating abortions that “the abortion will terminate the
life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.”227 The Ninth
Circuit has expressed that this compelled commercial speech disclosure is particularly concerning because it is highly politicized and
represents the government’s policy views.228 In compelling the
speech, the government adopts a specific viewpoint and forces the
speaker to express it.229 As stated above, the speaker risks the additional harm of listeners attributing the compelled statement to the
speaker.
b.
Harm to Listener
Compelling a commercial speaker to bolster the government’s
ideological beliefs is problematic because it can effectively distort
the marketplace of ideas, thereby insulting the listener or consumer
autonomy by allowing ideology to masquerade as fact.
224
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1.
DISTORTED MARKETPLACE AS AN INSULT TO AUTONOMY
“Listeners are harmed by [misattribution of government speech
to the commercial speaker] because it compromises two important
methods listeners use to decide whether to be persuaded by a message: the popularity of the message and the speaker’s level of authority.”230 The repetitive exposure to the message may lead listeners to adopt the government-mandated speech simply because it is
more popular.231 Further, because this speech is linked to the
speaker, who is the producer of the product and expected to have
expertise or authority, the listeners will be more likely to adopt the
speech.232 As previously stated, in allowing the government to dictate the information injected into the “marketplace of ideas,” there
will be distortion in what consumers should consider important.233
2.

IDEOLOGY MASQUERADING AS FACT AS AN INSULT TO
AUTONOMY
The relaxed “factual and uncontroversial” standard, coupled
with the consumer “right to know,” allows the government to deceive audiences by masquerading ideology as a fact. The government may use its coercive power for illegitimately paternalistic ends
in compelling protective speech that aims to persuade.234
However, every state attempt to compel speech does not disrespect audience autonomy.235 “The government’s goal makes a difference. Most suspect is when the state urges a course of action that
actually detracts from the audience’s autonomy. Urging people not
to vote, for example, would seem to undermine rather than enhance
people’s autonomy.”236
Less obviously, decisional autonomy is disrespected by “government attempts to change the audience’s mind on a contested
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Id. at 385.
See id. at 385–86.
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question.”237 The goal might be contested238 or the action endorsed
to attain that goal might be contested.239 “However acceptable it
might be for the government to urge a scientifically supported path
(e.g., eat vegetables) to a universally recognized goal (e.g., good
health), the government’s persuasion becomes problematic when it
takes sides on a controversial issue (e.g., prayer) and presumes to
know better than the individual what is best.”240
Additionally, when the government uses fear appeals, it is more
likely that the disclosure is ideological rather than an uncontroversial disclosure of a fact.241 The literature evaluating the persuasiveness of different types of fear appeals demonstrates the complexity
of the emotional and cognitive processing of these types of messages, and it illustrates that the key goal in implementing fear appeals is to appeal to the audience’s emotions and not to inform.242
The fear appeals means of compelling speech was utilized in
Planned Parenthood. The mandated disclosure aimed to appeal to
the fear and guilt of pregnant patients by warning them of the lifeending consequences of abortion. Ideology is too easily masqueraded as fact and compelled by means of the relaxed “factual and
uncontroversial” test and the consumer “right to know” justification.
The listener is deceived and may make decisions based on a distorted marketplace of ideas.
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CONCLUSION

Commercial speech is protected speech, and the First Amendment protects against speech compulsions just as it protects against
speech limitations. Compelled commercial speech has the ability to
undermine free speech goals and values by distorting discourse,
chilling speech, or intruding upon the autonomy of speakers or audiences. In order to avoid these issues, courts should subject compelled commercial disclosures to rational basis scrutiny only when
the compelled commercial speech is “factual and uncontroversial”
speech aimed at curing deception because the alternative—applying
rational basis when the compelled commercial disclosure is “factual
and uncontroversial” speech aimed at any legitimate state interest—
is unworkable and leads to inconsistent court rulings. Moreover, applying rational basis to such large swaths of disclosures may lead to
compelling too much information, the wrong kind of information or
bolstering ideological beliefs because there will always be a legitimate government interest to compel, i.e. the consumer “right to
know.” This would ensure that only legitimate and beneficial disclosures are compelled, and that First Amendment protections are
not abridged.

